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HEDGE-FUND FRAUD: RECENT CASES AND THE PRIME
BROKER's

Goon FAITH DEFENSE
JORDAN WEBER*

he Southern District of New York's recent bankruptcy
court rulings have baffled the prime brokerage industry.
Past legislation intended to insulate prime brokers from
risks associated with hedge funds through the good faith
defense; however, recent rulings have threatened to put prime
brokers on the hook for fraudulent hedge-fund losses. Juries who
decide whether prime brokers have acted in good faith may upset
the original risk distribution among brokers, investors, and hedgefund managers. The good faith defense should be available to prime
brokers like Bear Stearns who, after following normal industry
practices, fail to detect fraud immediately or at all.

T

l.

I NTRODUCTION

Bernard Madoff, a trusted member of the Wall Street asset
management community, was recently found to have defrauded investors of an estimated $50 billion. 1 The fraud dwarfs any Ponzi
scheme in recorded history and bas once again called attention to
what some see as a renegade industry. While the Madoff scandal
may not significantly impact the legal situation faced by prime brokers, it is a stark reminder of the evolving risk profile facing prime

•
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Carrie Coolidge, Lessons For Madoff Investors From The Bayou Fund
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brokers who could be forced to return margin payments from fraudulent fund managers. 2
A recent court decision ordering Bear Stearns to pay nearly $160
million for accepting payments from the fraudulent hedge fu nd Manhattan Investment Fund (MIF) threatened broad, detrimental implications for the financial services industry until it was overturned
on appeal roughly a year later. One senior partner at the law firm
Greenberg Traurig in New York was reported to say, "This decision
does not just affect prime brokers, but any firm that extends credit to
hedge funds. Essentially the judge is saying that anyone extending
credit to a hedge fund is a guarantor against fraud committed by that
hedge fund." 3
Prime brokers brought in over $10 billion of revenue from
prime-brokerage services in 2007. 4 With so much at stake, prime
brokers are reassessing risk profiles on their dealings with hedge
funds. If prime brokers unknowingly accept payments from fraudulent hedge-funds without doing the appropriate due diligence, they
could be forced to return large sums of cash that would otherwise be
used to cover positions made by the hedge-fund. The law protects
brokers who unknowingly accept such payments with the "good
faith defense." However, even in light of the recent jury ruling in
favor of Bear Stearns, it remains unclear what constitutes a goodfaith effort to avoid fraudulent transfers. Requiring prime brokers to
investigate high-risk hedge funds is incongruent with the intent of
policymakers who created safe-harbor provisions to protect clearing
firm s. T he law ought to first look to outside requirements and normal
industry practices to determine if a prime broker accepted a transfer
2

"Prime Brokers" are, loosely defined, entities that execute and clear trades
for hedge funds. A "margin payment" is the transfer of funds from a fund to
a broker for the purpose of posting collateral for borrowed assets.

3

Helen Avery, Litigation: ISDA and Fed Back Bear Stearns, EuROMONEY,
June 2007, at 44.

4

Jenny Anderson, Banks' Leases to Hedge Funds Are Ques.tioned, N. Y.
January 2, 2007, at AS.
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in good faith. 5 Under this bright line, bankruptcy law would operate
in agreement with common law governing fraudulent transfers and
with current pol icy that places the risk of hedge-fund failure on the
investors.

II.

BACKGROUND

Since the turn of the millennium, hedge funds have been the latest Wall Street craze; they represent everything that is exotic about
the growing complexity of financial markets. From 1999 to 2004,
assets managed by hedge funds increased by 260%.6 Funded by
"accredited" investors and not subject to the same regulations that
other funds must follow (e.g. mutual funds), hedge funds often use
highly leveraged (and, therefore, risky) strategies to produce greater
returns? These greater returns not only make hedge funds attractive, but the mystery in which hedge funds operate also piques the
public's interest. Most of the mystery stems from the complexity of
the financial transactions in which hedge funds traditionally participate. Hedge funds have experienced staggering growth in the past
decade, both in numbers and in assets managed.
As one might expect, the beginning of the hedge-fund boom also
brought the beginning of high-profile hedge-fund fraud. As investors became infected with the hedge-fund bug, so did ambitious fund
managers who wanted to take advantage of this new demand. In-

s

The first published instance of this proposal can be found in Peter S. Kim,
Navigating the Safe Harbors: Two Brightline Rules to Assist Courts in Applying the Stockbroker Defense and the Good Faith Defense. 2008 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 657.

6

Nathan Bryce, Hedge Funds, Liquidity and Prime Brokers, 13 FoRDHAM J.
CORP. & FtN. L. 475, 488.

7

Since the SEC's authority to regulate securities firms only intends to protect
small retail investors, hedge funds are mostly unregulated and do not need
to register with the SEC. See John Khambu, Til Schuermann, & Kevin J.
Stiroh, Hedge Funds. Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk. EcoN.
POI.'Y REv., Dec. 2007, at 2.
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stead of coming clean to their investors with their failed investments,
some managers engaged in elaborate Ponzi schemes, named after
the great 1920's swindler Charles Ponzi, to hide their losses from
investors. Ponzi schemes involve misstating returns on investments
to old investors in order to gain new investor capital. This capital is
then used to pay for the losses on original investors' positions. Usually the additional capital is simply invested in hopes of recouping
the original loss.
Michael Berger began operating Manhattan Investment Fund
(MIF) in early 1996. Berger intended to sell the equities of technology stocks short (which stocks, at the time, were trading at astronomical price-earnings multiples). The strategy failed miserably: during
its four years of operation Berger's fund lost over $300 million.8 To
conceal these huge losses, Berger engaged in the Ponzi scheme with
the hope that he would eventually make money for his investors.
In the mean time, he used the fraudulent statements of the fund's
performance to persuade new investors to provide more capital to
the fund. 9 This capital was used to cover the losses of the original
investors. When the lie had grown too large, Berger admitted to the
fraud after an investigation by the SEC in 2000. Soon afterwards,
MJF declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy.10

III. THE CASE AGAINST BEAR STEARNS SECURITIES
Soon after declaring bankruptcy, the creditors of MIF brought
legal action against Bear Stearns, the fund's prime broker, seeking
8

SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d, 187, 188- 89 (2d Cir. 2003).

9

/d.

I0

Kit Jarvis and Zachary Segal, United Kingdom: Hedge Fund Fraud: An
English Law Perspective On The Potential Exposure Of Prime Brokers , 24
Aug. 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=S0932.
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compensatory damages for Bear Stearns's knowledge of and assistance of the fraud. Bear Stearns won this case, successfully refuting
the assertion that it substantially assisted in the fraud. 11 Although
Bear Stearns was not legally liable for the losses incurred by investors in MJF, the various assets held by the fund, much of which
were tied up in their positions with Bear Stearns, were distributed
through the bankruptcy courts. Helen Gredd, trustee of the fund's
creditors, filed in the Southern District of New York's Bankruptcy
Court to have various assets held by Bear Stearns transferred to the
fund's creditors under Section 548(a)(l)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Of the payments sought by the trustee in the adversary proceeding, the debate centered on Count I, which sought $141.1 million in
margin payments transferred to Bear Stearns in the year before the
commencement of the Chapter 11 proceedings.
Section 548 allows a trustee to "avoid transfers" of-or regain
the rights to- any fraudulent transfer in which a party has an interest "provided that the transfer was made with an actual fraudulent
intent or with the badges of fraud constituting constructive fraud of
the debtor's creditors."12
The Bankruptcy Code allows for two major exceptions to Section 548 for certain parties. Bear Stearns asserted both of these exceptions, the stockbroker defense and the good faith defense, in its
arguments. This Article will concede to the court's ruling on the
stockbroker defense in order to focus on the issue of whether the
II

Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, (S.D.N.Y 2001). See
also Michael G. Shannon, United States: Clearing Firm Liability Update 2006- 2007, 28 Aug. 2007, n.4, http://www.mondaq.com/article.
asp?articleid=51640.

12

Gredd v. Bear Steams Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Fund Ltd.) 359 B.R.
510,516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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transfers were accepted in good faith. 13 The good faith defense in
Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts parties who accepted transfers of funds, regardless of their fraudulent nature, "for value
and in good faith". This defense is an affirmative defense, meaning
that the burden of proof rests upon the transferee. Judge Lifiand of
the Bankruptcy Court rejected Bear Stearns's arguments that it had
accepted the payments in good faith, and summary judgment was
awarded to the trustee. 14
This decision was reversed on appeal, however, when Judge
Naomi Buchwalz conceded, "Bear Stearns took a variety of steps to
uncover the truth about the Fund. We cannot say that no reasonable
jury could find that Bear Stearns's actions were diligent." 15 1n June of
2008, the jury found that the firm had acted in good faith, ending the
seven-year case and the roller coaster of decisions that had ensued.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF Gooo FArTH

IN BEAR STEARNs's CASE

Why did the bankruptcy court's original decision rule that Bear
Stearns had not accepted the transfers in good faith? To access the
safe-harbor of the good-faith provision of the bankruptcy code, a
clearing firm must meet two criteria: (1) the disputed transfer was
13

Many of the players in the primer-brokerage industry and groups of lawyers associated with the industry have questioned the reasoning, both prima
facie and from a public policy perspective, of the court's ruling that prime
brokers are "initial transferees" and thus are liable for accepting payments
made to defraud. Ifthese brokers are not initial transferees (the stockbroker
defense) or the payments are not made fraudulently, then the brokers are
released from liability. For the sake of the analysis of the good-faith defense
in context of the Bear Steams case, the Article will not discuss further the
arguments relating to these first two conflicts in the case. Rather, the Article
will concede, purely for the benefit of presentation, that Bear Steams (and
prime brokers in general) can be considered an "initial transferee" and that
all payments received by Bear Steams during the period in question were
fraudulent, and, therefore, that the stockbroker defense is unavailable to
Bear Steams.

14

Supra note 12, at 526.

15

Gredd v. Bear, Steams Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, Ltd.), 397
B.R. I, 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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accepted by the broker for value and (2) the broker accepted the
transfer in good faith. 16 Since there was no contention against the acceptance of the funds for value, this Article will only focus on what
circumstances constitute "good faith."

A.

WHAT R EALLY Is THE

Goov F AITH DEFENSE?

In its ruling that found Bear Stearns did not accept these transfers for margin payments in good faith, the court defined good faith
in the following manner:
"Good faith" under 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(c) includes not only
honest belief, the absence of malice, and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage, but
also freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought
to put the holder on inquiry. The presence of any circumstance placing the transferee on inquiry as to the financial
condition of the transferor may be a contributing factor in
depriving the former of any claim to good faith unless investigation actually disclosed no reason to suspect financial
embarrassment. 17
The Court found that Bear Stearns was "on inquiry" and that it had
not done enough investigation to clear itself of the responsibility of
not accepting fraudulent payments.
In its own bankruptcy-court case, Bear Stearns, in its use of
the good faith defense, bad the burden to prove that it had accepted
the margin-payment transfers without knowing (or without having
the responsibility to find out) that the transfers were fraudulent in
nature. Outside of U.S. Bankruptcy Court, however, Bear Stearns
would have no affirmative duty to prove good faith. 18 This affirmative requirement (with the burden of proof falling on the transferee)
is unique to bankruptcy law; common New York law requires that
the transferor prove that transfers were not made in good faith, as
16

II U.S.C.S. § 548(c).

17

Supra note 12, at 523.

18

Kim, supra note 5, at nn.53 & 54.
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do several other states. 19 Its burden was to refute the two assertions
of the Trustee regarding the good faith defense: that it bad been "on
inquiry" and that it had not performed sufficient investigation.

B.

DID BEAR STEARNS I GNORE FACTS AFTER BEING ON " I NQUIRY NOTICE"?

Under the court's definition of good faith, the entity that accepts
funds as a transferee can only accept transfers in good faith if it is
not "on inquiry notice" of "any" circumstance affecting the financial condition of the transferor. 20 What is inquiry notice? The MIF
case refers specifically to a cocktail party at which a Bear Stearns
employee, unaffiliated with the firm's arrangement with MIF, conversed with an employee of an investment management firm who
was discussing the performance of MIF. The MIF employee, inadvertently aware that the firm had not been performing well in its
accounts with Bear Stearns, appealed to others within Bear Stearns
concerning the discrepancy. Bear Stearns held a conference call with
MJF manager Michael Berger in which Berger claimed that more
than one prime broker had serviced the fund, a claim that both parties in the bankruptcy case agree to be a plausible circumstance.21
Bear Steams, in light of Mr. Berger's explanation, did not initiate
an investigation or report to the SEC until, in 2002, it became fully
aware of the fraud and reported it to the SEC.22 It did, however, question and notify MIF's auditor, the entity responsible for issuing opinions of the fairness of MIF's financial reporting. 23 After leami ng of
the discrepancies between their own records and the performance
related to them by a client of the fund, Bear Stearns was likely on inquiry notice. However, because Berger's explanations were plausible
and the auditor had been contacted, Bear Steams could not have
willfully ignored the fraud.
19

United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d 310,326 (2d Cir. 1994).

20

Supra note 17.

21

Anderson, supra note -4.

22

Supra note 12, at 526.

23

Supra note 15, at 8-9.
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The February 2007 bankruptcy court ruling held that Bear Stearns was required to investigate the possible fraudulent transfer at
the point when they became aware of facts that suggested a problem.24 For example, the court argued that the firm must be "aware
of sufficient facts concerning the debtors' precarious financial situation to place the [entity] on inquiry notice of the debtors' insolvency
and looming bankruptcy."25 Therefore, Bear Stearns was required to
show that no evidence from the exchange at the cocktail party-and
the events that followed as a result- indicated that any facts were
established to put Bear Stearns on inquiry notice. One often quoted
case describes such facts as "actual, open, and visible" inconsistencies with what has been recorded. 26 Bear Stearns's conversations at a
cocktail party, explained away by the nefarious Berger, were-while
certainly inconsistent with reality-not actual, open, visible facts.
The facts established at the party were only that there existed a discrepancy in what one investor was describing informally and what
the employee, who was not staffed on the relationship between Bear
Stearns and MIF, had heard at the office. No documents had been
shown and no visible inconsistencies had been established-this
is made clear by the fact that Berger provided a completely plausible explanation for the discrepancy in the conference call occurring shortly after the exchange at the party. It seems obvious that,
if financial statements were easily available to Bear Stearns after
the conference call to verify Michael Berger's explanation, the statements would be consulted in the event of an inconsistency in the explanation given by Berger. While it might be clear that the financial
statements indicating the number of prime brokers could have been
consulted, it is equally clear that the prime brokers have no outside
standard of conduct or due professional care by which they would be
required or expected to look at such statements.
In response to the defense that Berger's explanation was sufficient to take Bear Stearns off inquiry notice, the February 2007
decision argues that Bear Stearns was not satisfied with this expla24

Supra note 12, at 524.

25

In re Shennan, 67 F.3d 1348 (8th Cir. 1995).

26

Fanners State Bank v. Cunningham, 182 Minn. 244,246 (1931).
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nation, citing further investigations by Bear Stearns into the Fund's
performanceY The argument relies on the exhibition of a discomfort
with Berger's explanation; the discomfort, the argument contends,
shows that Bear Stearns was willfully ignoring or postponing proper
investigation into the nature of transfers from the fund. There is no
other concrete evidence, however, that Bear Stearns was uncomfortable with or had qualms about Berger's explanation. With no outside
standard by which to base a requirement for checking the financial
statements, the presence of inquiry notice could require the prime
broker to engage in any combination of arbitrary due diligence. Bear
Stearns should not be assumed here to have been on inquiry notice
simply because it chose to proceed cautiously.
Even if these conversations ought t~ have prompted Bear Stearns to undertake a more thorough investigation, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently ruled in Betz v. Trainer Wortham, Inc.
that certain circumstances could delay the necessity for action under
inquiry notice.18 This particular case allows for investors to delay the
point of inquiry notice if the fraudster answers questions and allays
the fears relating to a particular issue. The judge notes that subsequent actions by Bear Stearns employees with regard to MIF show
that they were not comfortable with Berger's explanations. In any
case, the test applied in Betz implies that Bear Stearns ought to have
been given more time to investigate the fraud (which it eventually
did) before it could be considered to be on inquiry notice.
Willful ignorance is also expressly used as a test for litigants
applying the good faith defense. After being on "inquiry notice" the
judge quotes In re World Vision Entertainment, Inc. to establish the
claim that Bear Stearns exercised willful ignorance. The case law
applied in this case denies the good faith defense for entities that
"put on 'blinders' prior to entering into transactions with the debtor
and claim the benefit of 548(c)."29 The court applies this test to an in27

Supra note 12, at 525.

28

Heide Betz v. Trainer Wortham, Inc., 486 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2007).

29

In re World Vision Entertainment, Inc., 275 B.R. 64 1,659- 60 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2002) (quoting In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 592 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1999) rev 'don other grounds, 277 F. 3d 838 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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surance agent who participated in a fraudulent program to sell promissory notes for which he was being paid a high commission.30 The
agent was uneducated, unlicensed, and broke the law in selling the
debt securities. 31 Not only did the agent have much to gain by putting
up "blinders" and ignoring the financial position of the originator of
the securities, he had an obligation to represent these investments
in promissory notes to his clients.32 He had, therefore, in licensing
requirements and professional requirements, a duty to look at the
financial statements and to assure that the program was sound, safe,
and legitimate.
Bear Stearns, on the other hand, had no legal obligation to review the financial statements of the Manhattan Investment Fund. It
had no interaction with its investors, who, interestingly, were quite
different from the elderly people defrauded in the World Vision Entertainment case. Those at Bear Stearns were educated enough to
know what particular explanations and claims would be plausible
and which would not be plausible. At no point was Bear Stearns
found to have been dishonest or untruthful in its dealings with MIF
or with the SEC investigation. On the other hand, Weaver, the insurance agent on trial in the aforementioned case, had been caught in
a lie about his due diligence regarding the legitimacy of the sales
operation. He argued that he had researched securities law and had
understood the requirements for selling the promissory notes under
state law. After considering that the insurance agent had not been
performing appropriate due diligence (which, importantly, is considered in context of his legal duties to his customers and the nature of
the business itself), the judge granted the contention that Weaver had
been willfully ignorant of the Ponzi scheme involved. 33
Unlike the business activities of Weaver, the nature of the Bear
Stearns business was not to make any qualifications or recommendations pursuant to the financial position of the company. It is only under bankruptcy law that any consideration of such knowledge is tak30

!d.

31

!d. at 650 n.3.

32

/d.

33

/d. at 660-63.
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en into consideration. The knowledge in Bear Steams's case would
have to be incidental, since, as a prime broker, its job is to deal with
high-risk investments that can, and often do, fail. Bear Stearns's job
is to keep tabs on the margin rates so that there is sufficient collateral to cover positions in a customer's account. In the industry, Bear
Stearns is not asked to look at the solvency of a hedge-fund client as
an accept-or-do-not-accept issue. Bear Stearns is solely concerned
with the solvency of the account alone. While Weaver may have
been required to perform diligence then "based upon verbal assurances from the debtor", this was a requirement of doing business in
the industry.34 In Bear Stearns's case, the judge held that they had
"put on blinders" by not parsing the financial statements in their possession to verify Berger's claim. Weaver's negligence, in the view
of the judge, was to avoid looking at basic agreements and credit
checks that, as an "experienced insurance agent", he should have
recognized. 35 The judge noted, "Weaver's cursory and almost nonexistent investigation indicates that he did not want to know more." 36
Hence, Judge Lifland in the citation of this case implies that Bear
Stearns ought to have "not wanted to know more". Bear Stearns,
however, held a conference call and continued to correspond with
MIF's auditor, Deloitte and Touche, regarding the fund's business.
This shows affirmatively that, while they may have had a question
for Mr. Berger, this question was answered. The inquiries made on
behalf of Bear Stearns did not represent an attempt to "not know
more". They showed that Bear Stearns was cautiously moving forward with the relationship, recognizing that the risk was higher but
continuing to act in accordance with their duties as MIF's prime
broker.
Expert testimony in the WVE case, accepted and relied upon
by the judge in his application of the "blinder" test, argued that a
broker "has a minimal duty of care owed to investors."37 The judge's
application of the good faith defense shows that the aforementioned
34

/d. at 650.

35

!d. at 651.

36

!d.

37

/d. at 644.
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norms of duty for investigating one's clients determine the level of
required diligent inquiry:
The clients rely on the brokers for financial advice. Therefore, the issue is whether these brokers act in good faith if
they make no or little effort to verify the legitimacy of the
debt instruments they market. Stated differently, can a broker simply rely on promises made by a dishonest and fraudulent debtor and still act in good faith? .. . The Court first
must define the steps a prudent broker acting in good faith
would take before selling the debtor's notes. Then, the Court
must determine if the defendants took these steps.
Prime brokers, for economic reasons, take different steps in
"acting in good faith" than a broker for the elderly takes. It would
be entirely appropriate for a prime broker to assume that hedge-fund
clients perform their own due diligence and, in exchange for a potentially higher return, assume the risks involved in such an arrangement.

C.

DID BEAR STEARNS PERFORM SUFFICIENT D UE DILIGENCE?

The court argues that, although Bear Stearns held a press conference with the fund manager who assured that Bear Stearns was
not the only prime broker, Bear Stearns should have examined the
financial statements that reported that Bear Stearns was the only
prime broker. T he court, citing case law, holds that "if the circumstances would place a reasonable person on inquiry of a debtor's
fraudulent purpose, and a diligent inquiry would have discovered the
fraudulent purpose, then the transfer is fraudulent." 38 The court argues that the fact that Bear Stearns did not look at the "easily attainable" financial statements shows that their inquiry was not diligent.
There is no articulation in the case of whether these financial
statements were recent and whether Bear Stearns regularly received
38

Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In re Agricultural Research and Technol-

ogy Group, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528,535- 36 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Sanitary Ice
Vending Co. v. Harris (In re Polar Chips Int' l, Inc.), 18 B.R. 480 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1982)).
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(or even reviewed) copies of these statements. Although it is unclear
why Bear Stearns would not catch this disclosure in the financial
statements, the circumstance in which Bear Stearns found itself "on
inquiry" in the view of the court was very informal. Since this information was circulating at a cocktail party, it would seem entirely
appropriate for Bear Stearns to engage in a proportionally informal
investigation of the claim. The conference call with Michael Berger
held soon after the cocktail party revealed a completely plausible
explanation for the discrepancy discussed as a result of the cocktail
party. Both parties in this bankruptcy case agreed that Berger's explanation was plausible. Therefore, with no legal duty to perform due
diligence on each hedge-fund client's relationship with its clients and
other prime brokers, it would be counterintuitive for these firms to
regularly perform due diligence for the sole purpose of preventing
transfers in a possible bankruptcy proceeding.
The law confirms this intuition. In 2002, for example, an analogous bankruptcy case involving Harrah's Entertainment found that
Harrah's was responsible for finding "easily obtainable information"
relating to the bankrupt party because this information was required
to be collected under Louisiana law. Bear Stearns however, bad no
such requirement. 39

V.

f UTURE iMPLICATIONS OF THE BEAR STEARNS R ULING

Prime brokers everywhere have been scrambling to understand
what these recent rulings mean for their business. In the midst of
downsizing and deleveraging in the investment banking industry,
prime brokers need to understand the risks involved in engaging in
business with hedge funds. Even if Bear Steams ought to have reported the MIF fraud earlier, its case demonstrates that prime brokers either need additional guidance to know the extent of due diligence required or they need to be allowed to access the good faith
defense when normal industry practices are followed.
Peter S. Kim of the Columbia Business Law Review, analyzing
the case before Bear Stearns succeeded in its jury trial, writes that
39

Meeks v. Red River Entertainment of Shreveport (In re Armstrong), 285
F. 3d I 092, I 096 (8th Cir. 2002).
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prime brokers will find significant confusion about what this means
for their risk-management procedures:
For prime brokers like Bear Stearns, this ruling raises serious questions about what steps it should have or could have
taken to appease the court. For example, would it have been
sufficient for Bear Stearns to have taken more steps to seek
out the fraud or did the broker actually have to uncover
the fraud? What about the court's determination that Bear
Stearns had not acted in a timely manner? Perhaps more
importantly, it also creates an unnecessarily large amount
of confusion for all other interested parties who now must
speculate whether their actions will be deemed adequate io
the future. 40
Ki m's point that prime brokers are left in the dark regarding
risk-management procedures requires a closer look. What did Bear
Stearns not do in the case of MIF that it should have done in order
to uncover the fraud? Perhaps speculation mentioned by Peter Kim
will have to be performed by each prime broker with regard to every
hedge-fund client. The cost of such speculation and due diligence
can be very high.
In addition, due diligence can be very difficult. For example,
the bankruptcy court originally found that Bear Stearns would be
on the hook for their margin payments even if the payments were
originally made without fraudulent intent. In these Ponzi schemes
performed by hedge funds , it is very unclear when or if a hedge-fund
manager decides to operate a Ponzi scheme simply to cover their
losses. According to previous rulings, a Ponzi scheme is fraudulent
from its outset. The industry will struggle on how to know, through
due diligence, to disregard margin payments "regardless of whether
[other] payments were made to early investors or41 whether the debtor
was engaged in a strictly classic Ponzi scheme."
40

Kim, supra note 5, at 683-84.

41

In re Manhattan Investment Fund Ltd., 310 B.R. 500, 509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002).

36
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While Howard Schiffman, the lawyer for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, has rightly proclaimed that
the jury's decision in the Bear Stearns's case can help to establish
"fact patterns" for the determination of future cases,42 it will still
be important to allow for a bright line based on industry norms so
that prime brokers can continue to operate in such a precarious market with the confidence that their current investigation policies for
clients are sufficient protection for bankruptcy proceedings. These
changes will prove necessary as high-profile cases such as the Bayou LLC case against Goldman, Sachs & Co. proceeds and as hedge
funds remain at the mercy of the courts. 43

V. CONCLUSION

The due diligence requirement under the good faith provision
was incorrectly applied in the original Bear Stearns ruling and would
have placed undue risk on prime brokers. Not only does analysis of
the case reveal that Bear Stearns, under normal conditions, responded reasonably to the inconsistencies it found in conversations with
MIF's clients, but it shows that, if a judge could rule one way and the
jury another, prime brokers still face the risk that courts will realign
the r isk distribution intended by policymakers in other cases. Peter
Kim states, "This minimizes the potential for courts to unwittingly
realign rights and responsibilities of financial counterparties outside
of bankruptcy and promotes overall stability in the marketplace.'" 4
Although Bear Stearns eventually triumphed in its jury trial,
prime brokers will still be in desperate need for concrete guidance

on due-diligence procedures. The court's own interpretations of
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the good faith defense support a standard of duty based on industry norms and expectations of due diligence, as advocated by Kim.
For prime brokers, policymakers have consistently shown that the
risk for hedge-fund failure-and, as a result, the burden of due diligence- ought to rest with investors and their representatives who,
according to the SEC, ought to be able to manage the risk in their
own portfolios.

